ESRC Research Seminar 5

Applied Complexity Theory as the New Framework for Public Policy

**Department of Hospitality, Leisure and Tourism Management
Business School, Oxford Brookes University**

*"Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets:
The Case of the Tourism Industry"*

Wednesday 10 March 2010, from **9.30** to **17.00 hrs**

Organised by Dr Alexandros Paraskevas at the Stuart Rooks Lecture Theatre,
Postgraduate Centre, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley Campus, Oxford

"Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets: The Case of the Tourism Industry"

Postgraduate Centre, Stuart Rooks Lecture Theatre, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley Campus, Oxford Wednesday 10 March 2010

SEMINAR SUMMARY

Prof. Eve Mitleton-Kelly is Director of the Complexity Research Programme at LSE; visiting Professor at the Open University; and Policy Advisor to European and USA organisations, the European Commission, several UK Government Departments; and to the Governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Netherlands, Singapore and UK.

In her opening presentation **Prof Eve Mitleton-Kelly** introduced the objectives of the seminar which were a better understanding of tourism as a 'soft target' for terrorism and the possible ways that the principles of Complexity Thinking can help policy makers in dealing with terrorism. She explained why terrorism should be viewed as a complex phenomenon and asserted that such complex phenomena cannot be addressed exclusively 'top down'. "What government can do is to create the right infrastructure and the right environment but unless there is distributed leadership and intelligence sharing terrorism cannot be countered" she said. "This complex phenomenon has to be dealt with at multiple scales and multiple levels (national, regional, local) at the same time."

Bernard Donoghue is the Head of Government and Public Affairs at VisitBritain. As Deputy Chair of the Tourism Industry Emergency Response group (TIER) he has particular experience in crisis management and liaison with COBRA, having headed up the organisation's response to the outbreak of Foot and Mouth, the events of September 11th 2001 and security incidents within the UK in recent years.

Bernard Donoghue started his presentation by defining what constitutes a crisis in the tourism industry and looking at the impact of past crises such as the Foot and Mouth disease and the London bombings he asserted that although the UK tourism industry cannot control the country's health or environment, "it can lessen the impact by advance planning and influencing and communicating consistently and providing information and reassurance to its stakeholders, particularly visitors." Donoghue pointed that a terrorist attack itself is less harmful than the fear it creates. "Our goal should therefore be not to

'worship the threat' by fuelling speculation and misinformation". He then presented VisitBritain's crisis management structure and the ways by which this organisation coordinates the industry's crisis response by connecting its various stakeholders through TIER (Tourism Industry Emergency Response) Group with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the prime minister's Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA). "VisitBritain's primary crisis management objectives are to limit speculation by providing an authoritative impact assessment and to leverage opportunities to demonstrate consumer confidence and kick-start recovery" said Donoghue and gave examples of TIER in action in crises such as in the avian and swine flu, cases of extreme weather events, the London bombings in 2005, as well as in preparation for the London Olympics.

For a video of Bernard Donoghue's presentation go to:
http://gwstream-old.brookes.ac.uk/hosp/crisis_management/dawn_gilpin_high.mov
(slight sound problems in the first couple of minutes)

Alan Orlob is the Vice President of Global Safety and Security for Marriott's international divisions. In his role, he oversees all safety and security operations and manages the crisis management program. He is a member and former committee chairman of the U.S. State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a security advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a founding member of the Hotel Security Working Group.

Alan Orlob pointed out the many parallels between what the tourism industry (authorities) and the hotel industry are doing to deal with terrorism. "We are doing so many things, the governments are doing so many things and there is certainly a nexus there" he said. He then shared his personal experience as a guest at the Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta when the double hotel bombing (JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton) took place last July and emphasised that hotels are increasingly becoming terrorist targets. "It is a little bit frightening to see the number of attacks to hotels. Since 2001 there have been more attacks in the hotel industry than any other industry in the world." Hotel targets are 'iconic', he said, bringing as an example the attack to Taj in Mumbai and the Marriott hotel in Islamabad and often associated with embassies. Embassies used to be targets but since they have been 'hardened up' by their governments the terrorists shifted their interest to the transportation industry and the hotel and tourism industry. Orlob then analysed three different cases of terrorist attacks to hotels: the Islamabad Marriott attack, the Mumbai attacks and the Jakarta attacks. "These were very different attacks in terms of tactics" he said "and it is very important for us to understand 'tactics' as they continuously evolve. We have to keep up with the tactics and try to keep ahead of them." Orlob emphasised the need for security in hotels to be analysed by professionals and underlined the importance of intelligence and counter-surveillance alongside all the physical security measures for the protection of soft targets. Some "security experts"

recommend that people should stay at hotels with lower profiles (3-star hotels) or even at guest houses when in high-threat locations. Orlob questions this advice saying that internationally branded hotels typically have higher security standards, even in hotels that are not located in hostile environments. "Is there greater risk of a terrorist attack or a hotel fire?" he asked. "Is kidnapping or assault more likely if the hotel does not have adequate security measures?" and added that "statistically, the risk is far greater from the latter instances than from a terrorist attack." Closing, Marriott's Vice President of Global Safety and Security presented the company's 15-point plan in dealing with a terrorist attack.

For a video of Alan Orlob's presentation go to:
http://gwstream.brookes.ac.uk/hosp/crisis_management/alan_orleb_2_high.mov

Prof. Alex P. Schmid is the Director of the Vienna-based Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and Editor of its electronic journal Perspectives on Terrorism. Previously, he was joint editor of 'Terrorism and Political Violence', the leading journal in the field. Until May 2009 Prof. Schmid held a chair in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, where he was Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.

Prof Alex P. Schmid offered to the audience a more academic perspective of the phenomenon of terrorism and its relationship with 'soft' tourism target. Referring to the speakers before him, he said "you are fighting fires and we are studying combustion". Schmid argued that there is not one commonly accepted definition of terrorism and that in his scholarly research he identified over 100 definitions. He then made a brief, but in depth, presentation of the debate over the years between scholars and legislators with regards to who is a terrorist and who a freedom fighter and the difficulty to objectively characterise specific acts and behaviours as terrorist depending on their legality and morality. Another issue that is problematic in defining terrorism, he said, is the unclear distinction state and non-state terrorism. Although, he argued, we cannot reach a clear definition of terrorism, we can "at least distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristics that make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is." He went on by identifying certain defining criteria for terrorism which are the motivation for the terrorist act (political or other), the target towards which it is normally directed (non-combatants), the fact that the direct targets of violence are not the main targets but serve as message generators, the actors (sub-national groups or clandestine agents) and the objective (creation of a fearful state of mind). When it comes to tourism targets, Schmid recognised that this may appear as a big problem for the people in the industry but, looking at the bigger picture, the risk that tourists face in being the victim of a terrorist attack is minimal compared to the risks they run in other activities of their lives.

Dr Dawn R. Gilpin is Assistant Professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University. She has spent more than 15 years working in Bologna, Italy in various areas of organizational communication and public relations, including crisis management. She has a master's degree in journalism and public relations from the University of Memphis, and a Ph.D. in mass media and communication from Temple University.

Dr Dawn Gilpin took a different approach to the topic by discussing the issue of crisis communications in the event of a terrorist attack at "a 'meta-level' and not at the level of immediate, on the ground, first line of response" focusing more on "how we can protect the legitimacy of tourism as an industry, and organisations and destinations within this system." She started by defining the tourism industry as a complex evolving system comprising a huge number of inter-related and interacting agents which do not necessarily see themselves as part of this system. However this complexity and interactivity results in local events having impacts at multiple levels, regional, national and global. "A terrorist attack taking place in India" she said "has repercussions at international level in the tourism system". Using Karl Weick's definition of crisis, Gilpin said that "a terrorist attack is a cosmology episode, a world changing episode" arguing that people being involved in such an incident see their perception of the world shift to a completely different direction. "Every terrorist attack changes completely the entire tourism system at all levels, in ways that the system will never be the same again." Most crisis managers and policy makers aim at re-establishing the status quo and try to bring the system 'back to normalcy', something that can never happen, since the system is not the same anymore. A successful outcome, from a complexity perspective, is an evolved system that can survive and thrive under the new conditions. Another outcome would be the acquisition of knowledge, even 'expertise' in dealing with terrorist attacks; expertise that is shared between all the components of the tourism system. Gilpin emphasised the point of 'becoming experts together' and urged the key players of the tourism industry not to "just share information but to work together" in order to develop the necessary expertise to counter the terrorism threat. In complexity thinking we shift our interest from the individual actors to the relationships between the actors. The industry deals with the terror threat in many different ways, some focusing on total physical protection, others on intelligence and others on a combination of both. Gilpin used the complexity concept of 'attractor basins' to describe the different behaviours that characterise industry responses to terrorism paralleling these to coloured jelly beans in a vase. A terrorist attack can make the various actors in the industry move from one colour grouping to another and we are witnessing changes in the ways that these actors are dealing with security and intelligence. Closing her presentation, Gilpin advised tourism organisations to a paradigm shift from the current 'complexity reduction' approach, which is more a command-and-control isolated way of dealing with terrorism to a 'complexity absorption' approach, which is a much more flexible one and more appropriate in high levels of uncertainty. "This means that you try to forge relationships, you pursue that embededness but in a broad sense and at multiple levels. It gives you more options for response and access to resources, information and expertise."

For a video of Dawn Gilpin's presentation go to:
http://gwstream.brookes.ac.uk/hosp/crisis_management/dawn_gilpin_high.mov

Dr Alexandros Paraskevas is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Risk Management. He has served as academic advisor in IH&RA's Global Council of Crisis, Safety and Security Management and is a member of the European sub-chapter of the Hospitality, Entertainment and Tourism Council (HEaT) in the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) professionals.

Dr Alexandros Paraskevas presented terrorism as a complex evolving system of multiple actors with variable degrees of connectivity. Terrorist groups of the past such as RAF, The Red Brigades and PIRA were more structured, tightly coupled and hierarchical whereas most groups today have loose ties among the members and are harder to detect and more unpredictable in their behaviour. He brought the example of Al-Qaeda which started with what is known as "Al-Qaeda prime" and had clear hierarchical structure with persons such as Osama bin Landen, Ayman al-Zawahiri, etc. This group evolved in a much more complex system which now includes numerous actors loosely connected to "Al Qaeda prime" such as the Al-Qaeda groups in Magreb (AQIM) and the Arabic Peninsula(AQAP) and numerous affiliate groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami (HUJI), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al Shabaab – all with activity against tourism targets. The system becomes even more complex if one includes the grassroot Jihadists or "lone wolves" which act on their own initiative responding to calls of various leading actors of the system. Paraskevas brought the example of AQAP's Nasir al-Wuhayshi calling jihadists to kill "any tyrant, intelligence den, prince or minister," and "any crusaders whenever you find one of them, like at the airports of the crusader Western countries that participate in the wars against Islam, or their living compounds, trains etc." He then argued that the current practice of 'command and control' approaches emphasising physical security and reacting to attacks are effective only up to a point. "'One size fits all' approaches are not relevant any more because terrorism is becoming increasingly complex." "In the past", he said, "terrorists were stereotyped as dark skinned, middle-aged males but is this stereotype relevant today when we have Reid, Padilla, Headley and Daood Gilani?" He also pointed out that the terrorists' modes of operation are equally variable ranging from complex such as in the attacks in Taba, Islamabad and Peshawar, to less complex such as in Amman, Mumbai and recently in Jakarta to even very basic such as in Pune or with the Christmas airline bomber. "Even target selection is relatively unpredictable" he said. "We all talk about 'soft targets' but are the Serena hotel in Kabul, the Pearl Continental in Peshawar, the Marriott in Islamabad, the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta really 'soft' targets?" Paraskevas closed his presentation in tune with Gilpin urging for a paradigm shift that embraces the complexity of the phenomenon and emphasises on collective tread-based and intelligence-led industry responses to the terrorism threat.

Following these presentations, speakers and participants discussed in groups formed based on their areas of expertise and their particular interests topics five topics brought up by the audience that could become areas for industry-academia research collaboration. The topics discussed were:

1. From 9/11 and the "Heathrow plot" to Mumbai, Jakarta and Pune: How can security keep up with the evolutionary loops of terrorism both in terms of target selection and modes of operation?

2. Beyond physical security: How can "soft targets" develop their own intelligence networks in order to prevent/mitigate a terrorist attack? What role can new technologies play in information sharing in order to develop thread-based and intelligence-led responses?

3. Is top-down government regulation (Law 24 in UAE/Dubai and SS545 in Singapore) the answer to the protection of soft targets? What are the opportunities and threats?

4. How can complexity thinking enhance the effectiveness of the 'Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to Protect Vulnerable Targets' initiative (UNICRI - United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy?

5. Can agent-based modeling provide effective results for terrorism threat/vulnerability/ risk analysis of social systems and identification of potential targets? Can they help in resource allocation? How can 'appropriate' context parameters be selected?

After a lively discussion, it was decided that these topics could be the basis of a new seminar series to be jointly organized by Oxford Brookes University and the London School of Economics during the course of the new academic year.

ESRC 5th Research Seminar

Applied Complexity Theory as the New Framework for Public Policy
Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets:
The Case of the Tourism Industry
Wednesday 10 March 2010
09.30 to 17.00
Oxford Brookes University

Prof. Eve Mitleton-Kelly

Director

Complexity Research Programme

LSE

www.lse.ac.uk/complexity

ESRC Research Seminars Competition 2007/8
6 Co-Applicants

- Prof. **Eve Mitleton-Kelly**, Director, Complexity Research Programme, LSE (Principal Organiser)
- Prof. **Brian Salter**, Professor of Politics of Biomedicine, Centre for Biomedicine and Society, King's College London
- Prof. **Jeff Johnson**, Professor of Complexity Science and Design, Open University
- Prof. **Peter Allen**, Professor of Evolutionary Complex Systems, Cranfield
- Prof. **Robert Geyer**, Professor of Politics, Complexity and Policy, Lancaster University
- Dr. **Alex Paraskevas**, Senior Lecturer, Oxford Brookes

Applied Complexity Theory as the New Framework for Management and Public Policy

Sem. 1 with KCL at LSE '*The Global Governance of New Health Technologies*' – 26 November 2008

Sem. 2 with OU at LSE: '*Energy Policy & Climate Change: the Contribution of Complexity Science*' – 24 March 2009

Sem. 3 at Cranfield: '*Modelling of Policy Decisions*' – 10 June 2009 + *papers from sems 2&3 in Special issue of E:CO*

Sem. 4 at Lancaster: '*Complexity and the International Arena*' - *6 Nov 2009 + papers to be published in special issue of Cambridge Review of International Affairs in June 2010*

Sem. 5 at Oxford Brookes '*Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets: The Case of the Tourism Industry*' – 10 March 2010

Sem. 6 at LSE: ESRC-LSE-SOCIONICAL '*Complexity as a Framework for Public Policy*' - *June/July 2010*

ESRC-LSE-SOCIONICAL *Seminar*

- SOCIONICAL: FP7 European project with 14 Partners in 10 Member States
- Using complexity theory to model and simulate the evacuation dynamics after a major disaster such as the 7 July 2005 London underground bombings
- Also studying how essential information can be disseminated during a disaster to aid the evacuation and reduce fatalities; one technology being tested is the use of ambient intelligent computing devices (e.g. mobile phones) to provide the necessary information, as well as other means of information dissemination and how these affect the decisions of survivors
- Following the 2006 Report of the Review on the bombings, which was submitted to the London Assembly, many recommendations were made and most were implemented
- However, there are still gaps in the overall strategic policy of how major disasters, such as flooding and terrorism can be addressed effectively.
- The seminar will focus on the strategic overview and ask what can complexity theory contribute as a new framework in this policy area?

Objectives

- Identify the grand challenges that could be addressed by complexity science &

- Develop ideas for multi-disciplinary research project proposals

  - ❑ Seminars only a starting point for networking & sharing of ideas
  - ❑ Other days will be organised to focus on the ideas and the projects – e.g. Workshops on 26 April 2010 on Complexity & Policy at LSE, one on climate change and the other on international policy
  - ❑ Publish papers on seminar topic by speakers & participants
  - ❑ Two special issues in Journals

Terrorism and the Complexity of Soft Targets:
The Case of the Tourism Industry

Challenges

Challenges

- Beyond physical security: How can "soft targets" develop their own intelligence networks in order to prevent/mitigate a terrorist attack? What role can new technologies play in information sharing in order to develop thread-based and intelligence-led responses?

- Is top-down government regulation the answer to the protection of soft targets? What are the opportunities and threats?
    - Law 24 (United Arab Emirates - Dubai) and SS545 (Singapore):

- How can complexity thinking enhance the effectiveness of the 'Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to Protect Vulnerable Targets' initiative, in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy?
    - UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute)

- From 9/11 and the "Heathrow plot" to Mumbai, Jakarta and Pune: How can security keep up with the evolutionary loops of terrorism both in terms of target selection and modes of operation?

- Agent based modelling for terrorism threat/vulnerability/ risk analysis of social systems and identification of potential targets: the challenge of selecting 'appropriate' context parameters. Models for resource allocation and relationships between parameters.

Process

- Network

- Put your name down for small group discussion in one area + register your interest in other areas

- Add more challenges during the day

- If you would like to lead the discussion on one topic, then say so

Thank you

E.Mitleton-Kelly@lse.ac.uk

www.lse.ac.uk/complexity

VisitBritain

Managing Expectations, Events and Risk

Bernard Donoghue

Chairman, VisitManchester
Deputy Chair, Tourism Industry Emergency Response Group
Head of Government and Public Affairs, VisitBritain

Oxford Brookes Seminar, 10th March 2010

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What is a Crisis?

- An **extraordinary event** which has an immediate and potentially sustained impact on the tourism industry eg. July 7 bombs and extreme weather.

- An **extraordinary response** from media or industry to an event that is non-critical to the tourism industry eg. foot and mouth disease.

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Past Crises: The Impact

- The cost of FMD and September 11 to UK tourism industry in 2001 alone was **in excess of £3billion**

- It took the industry **four years** to recover to pre-2001 levels

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Past Crises: The Impact

- The London bombings in July 2005 depressed spending by visitors by **£750 million** but overall Britain still received record level of visitors and spending

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Past Crises: Lessons Learned

- The UK tourism industry **cannot control the country's health or environment**, even when they may impact on its performance

- The UK tourism industry can **lessen the impact** by advance planning and influencing and communicating consistently and providing information and reassurance to its stakeholders, particularly visitors

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Past Crises: Lessons Learned

- The actual event is usually less harmful than the **fear** it creates

- Don't '**worship the threat**' by fuelling speculation and misinformation

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VisitBritain's Crisis Management Structure

INTERNAL

- Business Continuity Management Group
- Immediate Action Group

EXTERNAL

- TIER
- National Tourist Boards and England's Regional Tourism Delivery Partners
- Government – COBR, DCMS, DEFRA, Dept of Health
- Wider stakeholders

TIER Membership

- Association of British Travel Agents
- Association of Leading Visitor Attractions
- British Airways
- British Hospitality Association
- Department for Culture, Media & Sport
- English UK
- Tourism Alliance
- UKinbound
- VisitBritain (chair & facilitator)
- VisitEngland
- Visit London
- VisitScotland
- Visit Wales
- Regional Tourism Delivery Partners

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VB/TIER Objectives

- Provide **accurate, consistent information** to reassure and inform visitors

- Promote a clear **'business as usual'** message in UK and international media

- Ensure media worldwide and UK government are given **consistent messages** from Britain's tourism industry

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VB/TIER Objectives

- **Limit speculation** and provide the authoritative impact assessment

- **Leverage opportunities** to demonstrate consumer confidence and kick-start recovery

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 17, 2005

London After the Bombings: Life Goes On

By STUART EMMRICH

![VisitBritain]

TIER Planning in Action

- Avian Influenza

- Human/Swine Influenza

- Extreme weather events

- Terrorism

- Event specific - Olympics

Crisis Communications Objectives

- Provide information to reassure the consumer and to maintain confidence in the destination

- Provide timely and accurate facts and comment to the media

- Establish and maintain effective two-way communications with industry and Government

- Ensure staff welfare

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When a Crisis Occurs

- **Remind all staff that only press office should handle calls**

- **Log all media calls** – do not be pressured into providing comment until you have the facts but make a note of deadlines

- **Call in your designated crisis management team** determine who your spokesperson(s) will be and an out-of-hours team if necessary

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When a Crisis Occurs

- **Start a crisis management plan** as soon as possible, map out required actions and who is responsible

- **Dovetail media and other stakeholder communications** to ensure consistency of message

- **Keep key stakeholders, particularly staff, informed at regular intervals** of the actions you are taking and any advice that is relevant to them

- **Decide if any promotional activity should be stopped** - it could offend consumers and media

Dealing with Media in a Crisis

- All media calls should be directed to the Press Office

- If unable to provide a full statement, draft a **holding statement**

- Provide a **full statement** ASAP- stick to facts and advice from relevant authority. Update as required.

- **Do not be drawn into speculation or comparison**

Dealing with Media in a Crisis

What do the media want?

- FACTS

- INFORMATION

- REASSURANCE

- IMPACT

- VISITBRITAIN's ROLE

- Do not respond to inappropriate questions: We are not the police, Foreign Office or Department of Health, but try and provide details of who the media can call.

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Dealing with Media in a Crisis

- **In an internal crisis**, statements should be drafted in conjunction with the relevant authority for legal reasons

- If an employee has lost their life **NEVER** release details until the relevant authorities have notified next-of-kin

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After a Crisis

- **PR is often the best and only route to short-term recovery**

- Take time to assess the performance of your crisis management team and the organisation as a whole, incorporate lessons learned into your manual

VisitBritain

Useful information sources

visitbritain.org

VisitBritain's own website for UK tourism businesses. It contains marketing advice and details of all marketing opportunities available through VisitBritain, including international and domestic campaigns and promotions. In the event of any industry crisis it will also contain press statements, Q&As etc

UKresilience.info

the website of the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat. It provides links to government and non-government sources on a wide variety of emergencies and crises that can affect the UK, plus emergency planning guidance and government information

world-tourism.org

the website of the World Tourism Organisation. It provides access to basic statistics on world tourism, and a complete calendar of worldwide tourism events, as well as comprehensive crisis guidelines for the tourism industry

Protecting Soft Targets – Attacks on

Recent History

Marriott®

Serena Hotel Kabul
Militant Attack
14 January 2008

JW Marriott Jakarta
Bombing 5 August 2003

Taba Hilton After Terrorist Attack
7 October 2004

The attack outside Sheraton
Karachi hotel killed 11 Frenchmen
June 2002

![Marriott]

Islamabad Marriott - September 2008

Amman Hotel Attacks - November 2005

Jakarta Hotel Attacks – July 2009

Mumbai Attacks - November 2008

HOTEL ATTACKS 1993-2009 YTD

Islamabad Marriott Hotel Before 20 September 2008 Attack

Window film on all public areas

62 CCTV cameras monitored by three security officers at all times

196 security officers. 60 were on shift at the time of the attack.

Under-vehicle cameras monitored by security officer in security booth

There were four bomb sniffing dogs

A combination of a drop down barrier and hydraulic Delta barriers

- Bombing occurred at 8:02 pm.
- Hotel running 47% occupancy
- Up to 1,500 people in the hotel, celebrating "Iftar".
- A suicide bomber drove a six-wheel dump truck loaded with 1,320 lb (600 kg) of explosives believed to be a combination of TNT, RDX and Aluminum.
- The vehicle tried to break through but was stopped by the barrier, suicide bomber decided to detonate the device.

Islamabad Marriott Hotel Attack
20 September 2008 - Aftermath

- 56 dead
  - 5 hotel guests
  - 13 patrons
  - 8 others
  - 30 employees –
    20 of them were security officers
- 265 wounded (35 foreigners)

- Crater measured 60 ft. (18 m) across and 25 ft. (7.6 m) deep
- 132 ft. (40.23 m) stand off vehicle checkpoint to the hotel.

- Fire broke out

- Severe structural damage

Targets – Anti-Western

Popular restaurant for backpackers and Western travelers (Café Leopold)

- **Security should be analyzed by professionals**

- **Develop surveillance detection team**

- **Plans should be kept current and shared with authorities/joint training exercises**

- **Install exterior CCTV cameras to detect suspicious surveillance activities**

- **Elevators controlled by specific floor key card**

- **Develop active shooter program**

- **Promote security awareness among employees**

Threat Condition "Red" Precautions

- Security Officer at front entrance at all times

- Security patrols of perimeter hourly

- Note and approach anyone taking photos

- Metal detector screening of all persons entering hotel

- Guest's luggage inspected

- Identification required and recorded for all vehicles entering parking lots

- No vehicles unattended within 20 meters of building

- All vehicles inspected prior to entry in parking lots

- Current lists of associates and guests emailed to central repository daily

❖ *Threat Condition Procedures are audited*

JW MARRIOTT.
JAKARTA

REGISTRATION CARD

Arrival Date / Tgl. Kedatangan	Flight / ETA / Penerbangan		Departure Date / Tgl. Keberangkatan	Flight / ETD / Penerbangan
15-07-09			17-07-09	

No. of Guests Jumlah Tamu	Room Type Jenis Kamar	Room Rate Tarif Kamar	Room No. Kamar	Confirmation No. No. Konfirmasi	Account No.	Reservation Type
1 /0	DKN	140 USD	1308	24761224		CHECKED IN

Name / Nama (Mr./Mrs/Miss)	Surname Nama Keluarga	First and Middle Name Nama Depan dan Tengah	Passport No. / ID No. No. Passport / No. KTP / SIM
	Hasdi	Nuri	D9530560003827088

Address Alamat	Residential / Rumah	Business / Kantor	Purpose of Visit / Maksud Kedatangan

Pondok Pinang Rt 10 Rw 001

Kebayoran Lama

Date & Place of Issue /Tgl. & Tempat dikeluarkan

	DD / Tgl.	MM / Bln.	YY / Thn.

Nationality / Kebangsaan

ID

City Kota	Jakarta Selatan	State / Province Prop./Art	Jakarta Selatan

Date of Birth / Tgl. Lahir

Country Negara	ID	Postal Code Kode Pos	

DD / Tgl.	MM / Bln.	YY / Thn.
20	03	82

Company Perusahaan		Position / Occupation Posisi / Jabatan	E-mail / Telephone No.
			ANAKJAKARTA2012@YAHOO.COM 628774800290

Guest Code	Frequent Flyer Program Program Pelanggan Terbang	FFP No.	Marriott Rewards No.

Mode of Payment
Pembayaran

Cash / Tunai	[X]	American Express	[ ]	BCA Card [ ]	Traveller's Cheques [ ]
Visa Card	[ ]	Diners Card	[ ]	Voucher [ ]	Others (please specify) / Lain-lain [ ]
Master Card	[ ]	JCB Card	[ ]	Company Acct. /Perusahaan [ ]	

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
Dealing with a Hotel Terrorist Attack

1. Have a crisis plan and crisis team. Rehearse the plan. Ensure everyone on the team knows their role.

2. Have a system for risk analysis. Understand the threat and implement preventative measures to defeat or mitigate an attack.

3. First responders should be readily identifiable.

4. First responders should be trained in triage.

5. Evacuation needs to be considered carefully.

6. Window film saves lives.

7. Initial crisis meeting should be brief and confined to immediate needs.

8. Have a plan to access guest and employee lists.

9. Dispatch representative to local hospitals.

10. Determine where to relocate guests

11. Consider how to deal with media

    1. Become a "myth buster"

    2. Tell your story

12. Dealing with authorities

13. Reach out to injured guests and associates

14. Counseling for associates

15. After action review

Physical Security

- Walk thru metal detectors at ALL entrances

- X-Ray at ALL entrances

- Vehicle barriers (Delta) when possible

- CCTV on inspection points

- Elevators require specific floor keys

- Blast film on windows

- Explosive sniffer dogs/Trace detectors

- Surveillance Detection teams

- Plans/Photos/Rosters maintained on server

Western Branded Hotels

- Sprinkler systems/smoke evacuation

- Electronic door locks

- In-room safes

- Viewports/Night latch/deadbolt locks

- Food sanitation standards

- Trained security staff/Response plans

- CCTV

- Restaurants in-house

- Fitness Center/Entertainment options

- "There's always too much security until the day when there wasn't enough"

  - Judge William Webster, former Director of the FBI and CIA.

Terrorism and the Protection of Soft Targets

Insights from Complexity

Alexandros Paraskevas

Oxford Brookes University

Complexity Thinking

- Brings together concepts and theories related to the study of dynamic, non-linear systems.

- Provides a lens and a vocabulary to explain phenomena that modern scientific analysis cannot adequately describe or predict.

- ***Complicated system*** (or problem) is constructed by a multitude of components but each one of its parts, and the whole, can be measured and understood.

- ***Complex system***, is a set of multiple, diverse, interconnected and interdependent components that cannot really be analysed part by part, as the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Terrorism as a Complex System

- Consists of a huge number of diverse interrelated – interconnected components.

- Variable degrees of connectivity (RAF, Red Brigades, IRA, FARC-EP, ETA, Al Qaeda)

- No linear relation between cause and effect – butterfly effect.

- Does not 'behave' in a straightforward, predictable way, so any prediction is hazardous.

- Control over it is virtually impossible.

- Adapts to environmental changes and evolves together with their environment

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda Prime
(Osama bin Landen, Ayman al-Zawahiri, etc.)

Al Qaeda Groups & Affiliates
(AQIM, AQAP)
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami (HUJI)
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Al Shabaab

Grassroots Jihadists

Nasir al-Wuhayshi (AQAP)

…*"any tyrant, intelligence den, prince or minister", and "any crusaders whenever you find one of them, like at the airports of the crusader Western countries that participate in the wars against Islam, or their living compounds, trains etc."*

Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battle)

Dealing with this complexity

- Linear 'command and control' approaches are effective only up to a point. 'One size fits all' approaches is not relevant any more (profiles, e.g., R. Reid, J. Padilla, …, D. Headley – Daood Gilani; and MOs, Taba, Amman, …, Kabul, Mumbai, Peshawar, …, Jakarta 2, Pune)

- Complexity thinking suggests that *"in order for a system to achieve control, its internal variety must be equal to or larger than the variety of the external turbulence it is subjected to"*

  Ashby, W.R (1956) Introduction to Cybernetics London: Wiley (chapter 11)

Challenges

1. From 9/11 and the "Heathrow plot" to Mumbai, Jakarta and Pune: How can security keep up with the evolutionary loops of terrorism both in terms of target selection and modes of operation?

2. Beyond physical security: How can "soft targets" develop their own intelligence networks in order to prevent/mitigate a terrorist attack? What role can new technologies play in information sharing in order to develop thread-based and intelligence-led responses?

3. Is top-down government regulation (Law 24 in UAE/Dubai and SS545 in Singapore) the answer to the protection of soft targets? What are the opportunities and threats?

4. How can complexity thinking enhance the effectiveness of the 'Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to Protect Vulnerable Targets' initiative (UNICRI - United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy?

5. Can agent-based modeling provide effective results for terrorism threat/vulnerability/ risk analysis of social systems and identification of potential targets? Can they help in resource allocation? How can 'appropriate' context parameters be selected?